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The nature of the negotiated outcomes of the eight issues of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was studied in terms of their integrative and distributive aspects. In 
cases where integrative elements were found, further analysis was conducted by 
concentrating on Pruitt's five types of integrative solutions: expanding the pie, 
cost cutting, non-specific compensation, logrolling, and bridging. The results 
showed that real world international negotiations can arrive at integrative 
agreements even when they involve redistribution of resources (in this casi 
redistribution of former Yugoslavia). Another conclusion was that an agreement 
can consist of several distributive outcomes and several integrative outcomes 
produced by different kinds of mechanisms. Similarly, in single issues more than 
one mechanism can be used simultaneously. Some distributive bargaining was 
needed in order to determine how much compensation was required. Finally, 
each integrative formula had some distributive aspects as well. 
Integrative and distributive bargaining are two important conceptual constructs of the 
negotiation literature. It would not be wrong to argue that the terminology was inspired first 
by the categories and techniques of game theory. Accordingly, Rapoport's (1960) work on 
"Fights, Games and Debates" and Schelling's (1960) "Strategy of Conflict" are important 
points of departure. In the behavioral tradition, 
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Walton and McKersie (1968) first made the distinction between distributive and 
integrative bargaining within the context of labor management negotiations. They 
defined distributive bargaining as "a hypothetical construct referring to the complex 
system of activities instrumental to the attainment of one party's goal when they are in 
basic conflict with those of the other party" (p. 4). Integrative bargaining, on the other 
hand, refer "to the system of activities which is instrumental to the attainment of 
objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other party and 
which therefore can be integrated" (p. 5). 
Since then, integrative and distributive bargaining has become an essential 
perspective in understanding, analyzing, and teaching negotiations. An important 
aspect of this literature is the treatment of integrative and distributive bargaining as 
essentially mutually exclusive processes. Based on these two constructs, different 
conceptual variations have been created by various authors. Positional bargaining 
versus interest based bargaining (Fisher & Ury, 1981), competitive versus cooperative 
bargaining, bargaining versus problem solving (Hopmann, 1995), win-lose versus 
win-win negotiations (Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994), and creating 
versus claiming value (Lax & Sebenius, 1986) are concepts used to explain similar 
phenomena. In these studies the terms distributive and integrative were not always 
used to refer to "situations" as in the case of Thompson (1990), but also to "the 
process" (Donohoe & Roberto, 1996; Walton & McKersie 1968) and sometimes to the 
"outcome" of negotiation (Pruitt, 1981). 
Experimental researchers have conducted several studies to measure the impact 
of different variables on integrative outcomes. The affect of framing (Bottom & Studt, 
1993; Simons 1993; Mannix, Tinsley, & Bazerman, 1995); the mobility of negotiators 
(Mannix et al., 1995); time pressure (Yukl, Malone, Hayslip, & Yamin, 1976; 
Carnevale & Lawler, 1986) negotiator's experience (Thomson 1990); ingroup identity 
(Kramer & Brewer 1984); depersonalized trust (Brewer 1981); and social motives, 
trust, and punitive capability (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998) on 
integrative outcomes have been studied. Effective integrative negotiation often 
involves information exchange (Thomson 1991), trust (Kimmel, Pruitt, Mgenau, 
Konar-Golband, & Carnevale, 1980), the expectation of future cooperative exchange 
(Ben Yoav & Pruitt, 1984), and third parties to facilitate exchanges. 
Literature on negotiations often draws a direct link between parties' distributive 
behavior and the achievement of a distributive outcome, and vice versa. Accordingly, 
while behaviors such as threats, commitments, bluffs, and concealment of information 
are presumed to lead to distributive outcomes, behaviors such as, rewards, promises, 
joint problem solving, and frank and open communication are expected to induce 
integrative solutions (Pruitt, 1981; Lewicki et al., 1994). 
Different authors have challenged the distinction between integrative and 
distributive bargaining. Lax and Sebenius (1986) explicitly argued that typical 
negotiation processes involve both integrative (value creating) and distributive (value 
claiming) behavior. In their view, "No matter how much creative problem solving 
enlarges the pie, it must still be divided; value that has been created must be claimed" 
(p. 33). Bartos (1995) modelled integrative bargaining as distributive bargaining with 
a search process, and showed that integrative negotiation is not necessarily time-
efficient, and the search process per se does not create an amicable environment. Only 
a joint search process (face to face bargaining) creates an amicable environment. 
Beriker (1995) suggested that real world international negotiations involve strategies 
and tactics of both distributive and integrative bargaining together with all tactics, 
creating a situation which helps to converge distributive bargaining into integrative 
negotiations. Putnam's (1990) review of research shows three main inclinations in 
elaborating the relationship between integrative and distributive bargaining. The first 
is the separate model, which assumes the two processes to be mutually exclusive 
events. The second is the stage model, which claims that bargainers typically start with 
distributive attitudes and then move toward an integrative mode. The third is the 
interdependence model, which assumes that integrative and distributive tactics are 
dependent on each other for their existence. In the context of hostage negotiations, 
Donohoe and Roberto (1996) showed that each model could emerge depending on the 
contextual parameters. Atiyas and Beriker (1997) addressed the importance of formal 
modelling in describing integrative and distributive situations and in advising related 
processes. 
Studies on integrative negotiation are mostly based on the findings of the 
experimental research tradition. What is missing, however, is the role of integrative 
negotiation in real world diplomatic negotiations. Studies on diplomatic negotiations 
often involve historical, legal perspectives, and case studies; and they are not 
particularly focused on integrative aspects of real world negotiations. 
Negotiated Outcomes 
Distributive outcomes are attained through the allocation of fixed sums of 
goods among the negotiating parties. It often involves a settlement that is some-
where in between the resistance points of the two parties (the bargaining zone). A 
good illustration of a distributive bargaining situation is a haggle over the price of a 
single item, such as a second-hand computer. In such a bargaining situation, 
generally, negotiators start with an asking price (target point) and through give and 
take, they try to finalize the process as close to the other party's resistance point as 
possible. The resistance point is the price beyond which the party refuses to give 
any concession (Lewicki et al., 1994). Cooptation is an extreme form of 
distributive outcome where one party gets all its demands and the other gets 
nothing. 
Integrative outcomes, on the other hand, allow agreements that satisfy both 
parties' needs. They are settings in which participants can consider multiple issues 
at the same time and make trade-offs to generate relatively high joint gains (De 
Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000) According to Pruitt and Rubin (1986) social 
motives are the key to integrative agreements. The dual concern model assumes 
two types of concerns: concern about own outcomes and concern about the other's 
outcomes. The model predicts that integrative agreement are more likely to be 
achieved when a negotiator has a strong concern about both its own and the other 
party's outcomes. 
The integrative bargaining literature suggests five basic types of mecha-
nisms to achieve outcomes that deliver higher joint benefits to the parties (Rubin, 
Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). In logrolling, each party gives concessions on issues that are of 
relatively low priority to themselves and high priority to tire other party typically in 
exchange for concessions by the other party on issues with the opposite characteristics. 
In cost cutting, one party gets what s/he wants and the other gets compensated for the 
losses s/he incurs. Nonspecific compensation occurs when one party gets what s/he 
wants and compensates the other. Hence it is similar to cost cutting except for the fact 
that the compensation is not related to any of the issues directly bearing on the bar-
gaining problem. Bridging is also similar to logrolling. However, here, trade takes 
place not between the issues, which were originally on the bargaining table, but 
between the interests underlying those issues. Finally, in expanding the pie, the parties 
simply expand the amount of resources available for negotiations. 
In this study, the five mechanisms of integrative negotiations are used to ana-
lyze the nature of the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace agreement. To the best 
of our knowledge, it is the first time that these categories have been used to analyze a 
real world diplomatic negotiation. 
Method 
In order to be able to formulate the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton 
Peace negotiations, according to different agreement mechanisms, the following 
analytical points need to be identified: (a) the initial positions of the parties—aspi-
ration levels and resistance points, to depict distributive outcomes; (b) the under-
lying interests behind the positions-for outcomes that involve bridging, nonspecific 
compensation, and cost cutting; (c) priorities placed on the issues—for logrolling, 
and (d) the actual outcomes i.e., what the parties get at the end of the negotiation 
process—for all outcomes. Similarly, identification of the issues and the parties is 
an additional task for the analysis. For this purpose, the following six questions are 
formulated: 
1. What was the issue/sub-issue? 
2. Who were the negotiating parties to this issue/sub-issue? 
3. What was each party's position concerning this issue/sub-issue? 
4. Why did the parties take such positions concerning this issue/sub-issue; 
what were the underlying interests? 
5. What were the priorities of each party concerning this issue/sub-issue? 
6. What did each party get at the end of the negotiations? 
In this research, the above questions were systematically asked and answered 
for each issue of the Dayton negotiations to depict the nature of the outcomes and 
mechanisms used for the attainment of those outcomes. Therefore, the account of 
each negotiation presented in the next section follows the same format, that is, a 
point- by- point presentation of the answers to the above questions. 
The answers to the questions were generated by analyzing: (a) Primary news 
resources including Keesing's Record of World Events, Facts on File, Summary of 
World Broadcasts, and OMRI Daily Digest, for the period 1991-1995; (b) the text 
of the Dayton Agreement; (c) daily newspapers; and (d) memoirs of the diplomats. 
In this study, we defined parties as the official participants to the negotiations. 
Therefore, in referring to the parties, in the text, we used the names of each ethnic 
group, i.e., "Muslim-Croats" or "Bosnian Serbs." However, we did not use the 
names of the representatives of the ethnic groups to avoid a possible discussion on 
the issue of legitimacy of the representations. We treated parties' initial positions as 
parties' official negotiating positions at the beginning of the US involvement to the 
conflict in February 1994. Final positions are the actual outcomes of the Dayton 
Peace Talks. 
Accordingly, in the analyses, an outcome will be called "distributive" (a) if a 
fixed resource (land, money, military equipment, etc.) is simply shared among the 
parties; (b) if one party acquires the total of what he/she asks for and the other 
party obtains nothing; and (c) if the parties achieve an agreement by giving con-
cessions from their opening demands and settle with a position closer to their 
resistance point. (In this case, identification of target points, second best positions, 
and resistance points from documentary data is essential in order to claim an out-
come as distributive.) 
We label an outcome as "non-specific compensation" when one party gets the 
total of what he/she originally asks for, and the other party receives some items 
which are not related to the original negotiated issues. 
Similarly an outcome is called "cost cutting" when one party gets the total of 
his/her demands and the other party obtains some items, related to original issue, in 
order to decrease the cost occurred. 
"Logrolling" is identified if parties express different priorities on an issue and 
exchange concessions on the items that are of relatively low priority to themselves. 
(To be able to detect logrolling identification of parties' priorities from 
documentary data is essential.) 
Finally, an outcome is called "bridging" if parties come up with a new and 
creative solution which satisfies all parties' interests. 
Background to the Negotiations 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established in 1945 was com-
prised of six republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Slovenia, and two fully autonomous regions within Serbia: Kosova in 
the south and the Vojvodina in the east. In keeping with the escalating nationalist 
movements and ethnic tensions, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence 
from the Yugoslav Federation on June 25, 1991. Furthermore, toward the end of 
1991, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina took concrete steps toward independ-
ence. On October 15, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its sovereignty.1 
The Croat, Muslim, and Serb forces began fighting for control of strategic 
areas after the republic declared full independence on March 3, 1992. The military 
situation deteriorated rapidly and by mid-1992 international concern began to grow 
with the realization of how much the situation had deteriorated, and could get even 
worse as the Serbs declared their intention of linking Serbia proper with the Serb 
enclaves in Bosnia and Croatia. Given all these developments, the international 
community launched several peace initiatives in order to end the conflict. The 
Accounts of the negotiations are based on news sources including Keesing's Record of World 
Events, Facts on File, Summary of World Broadcasts, OMRI Daily Digest, and 
International Herald Tribune, for a period of 1991 -1995. 
European Community (EC) made the first attempt. This was followed by the UN 
and the EC. The Vance-Owen mediation effort was based on the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into ten provinces within a decentralized state. 
Another UN-EC peace initiative was mediated by Lord Owen and Thorwald 
Stoltenberg but did not bring tangible results. 
The first time the U.S. acted decisively to end the conflict was in February 
1994. The US strongly backed the establishment of a confederation of the Muslim-
Croat regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on March 18, the federation agreement 
was signed. 
Russia, Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S. under the name of the "Balkan 
Contact Group" began the next peace attempt in April 1994. The Contact Group 
proposed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of a 49-51% division in favor 
of the Muslim-Croat side. This proposal later constituted the basis for the new US 
peace initiative. 
It was the Dayton Peace Process that produced an agreement bringing an end 
to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina through effective U.S. mediation. A very critical 
aspect of this US peace initiative was the pressure used by the U.S. through the 
NATO air strikes to bring the parties, mainly the Bosnian Serbs, to the negotiation 
table. The three main issues which were finalized at the Dayton negotiations were: 
(a) the territorial issue; (b) the constitutional issue; and (c) the issue of Sarajevo. 
The US Peace initiative began in the middle of August, and as a consequence 
of the mediation of Richard Holbrooke, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed 
on Decemberl4, 1995 in Paris (see Holbrooke, 1998, for a detailed account). Table 
1 summarizes the milestones of the U.S. Peace Process. 
The territorial issue consists of four sub-issues, which are (1) the percentage 
of territory each party would get; (2) control of Gorazde and the land link between 
Sarajevo and Gorazde; (3) control of Eastern Slavonia; and (4) the Posavina Cor-
ridor and Brcko. The constitutional issue comprises three sub-issues, which are (1) 
the integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina; (2) political authorities of the 
state; and (3) the name of the state. The issue of Sarajevo has no sub-issue. 
Analysis 
Percentage of Territory Each Party Would Get 
Long before the US Peace Initiative, which was unveiled on August 9, 1995, 
the Contact Group, in May 13, 1994, proposed the division of Bosnian territory 
such that Bosnian Serbs would control 49% of the land and the Muslim Croat side 
would control 51%. At that time, the Bosnian Serbs had rejected the 49% proposal 
as they were controlling 70% of the country and had military supremacy on the 
ground. 
Table 1  
Milestones in the US Peace Process 
Date Event 
August 16, 1995 The introduction of the U.S. Peace Plan and the 
beginning of Holbrooke's mediation effort 
August 28, 1995 Bosnian Serb shelling of a market place in Sarajevo 
August 30, 1995 The beginning of NATO air strikes against Bosnian 
Serbs 
September 2, 1995 The suspension of NATO air strikes against Bosnian 
Serbs 
September 6, 1995 The resumption NATO air strikes against Bosnian 
Serbs 
September 8, 1995 The Geneva Accord The question of integrity of the 
state was worked out 
September 16, 1995        The suspension of NATO air strikes against Bosnian 
Serbs 
September 26,1995 The New York Accord 
The    constitutional    arrangements    for    Bosnia-
Herzegovina were worked out. 
October 5, 1995 The Cease-fire Agreement 
November 1, 1995 The beginning of the peace talks in Dayton, Ohio 
November 21,1995        The text of the Dayton Peace Agreement documents 
has been initialled in Dayton. 
December 14, 1995        The Dayton Peace Agreement has been signed in 
Paris. 
At the beginning of the Dayton talks the Muslim-Croat side said that any 
peace plan's demarcation should not be more disadvantageous than the plan of the 
Contact Group, which indicated that the percentage of the territory they would 
control should not be less than 51%. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, stated 
that they would consider it "painful" if they would get less than 70% of the terri-
tory as they then controlled 70% of the country. Furthermore they could consider it 
"unjust" if they would get less the 64% territory. The final territorial division in the 
Dayton Agreement gave 49% of the country to the Serb Republic while 51% of the 
country would remain under the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
There were two important events, which were decisive in making the Bosnian 
Serbs accept the 49-51% division: The Croat offensive and the NATO air strikes. 
The successful operation launched by the Croatian forces in early August 1995 to 
recover control of the Krajina region from the rebel Croatian Serbs, caused the 
Bosnian Serbs to lose territory on the ground and supremacy in the battlefield. On 
August 30, 1995, as a direct response to the Sarajevo mortar bombing by Bosnian 
Serbs, NATO launched "Operation Deliberate Force" and bombed Serbian targets. 
By the middle of September, the Bosnian Serb-controlled territory had already 
decreased from 70% to 50% (International Herald Tribune, 9 September 1995). 
The solution that was reached as a result of the peace process seems to be an 
imposition rather than a process where the parties negotiated for joint benefits. The 
US imposed this division by implicitly balancing the military situation in 
accordance with the 49-51% basis. Therefore, if the Bosnian territory is considered 
as a pie, the pie was divided on a 49-51% basis. Issue linkages were not made in 
the achievement of the final formulation. Within this framework, this solution is 
best described as a distributive outcome. 
Control of Gorazde and the Land Corridor 
between Sarajevo and Gorazde 
Gorazde is a town that is close to the Serb border (Figure 1 presents a map of 
the municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The Muslim-Croat side wanted to have 
control of Gorazde with a land link between Gorazde and Sarajevo. The underlying 
interest of this demand was to connect the Muslim enclave of Gorazde with the rest 
of the Muslim territory by linking it to Sarajevo. Second, such a corridor would 
make it possible for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to build two or three 
hydroelectric plants, which had previously been planned. Thus, the Muslim-Croat 
side wished to have control of Gorazde and wanted to link Gorazde with the rest of 
their territory to lift the blockade of the city, but more specifically to link Gorazde 
with Sarajevo to be able to build hydroelectric plants. Both of these demands were 
important for the survival and the development of that city. 
The Bosnian Serbs also wanted Gorazde. They had three underlying interests 
of which the first was to have integral Bosnian Serb territory. Bosnian Serbs 
wanted integral, not disconnected territory. If Gorazde remained a Muslim town 
surrounded by Serb territory, this would, they claimed, obviously prevent the 
realization of Serbian territorial integrity. What is more, the Bosnian Serbs wanted 
to remove the last vestiges of the Bosnian Muslim community from their borders 
and thus asserted that Gorazde, a Muslim enclave, should be controlled by the 
Bosnian Serbs. The second reason was that a strategic route connecting much of 
the Bosnian Serb territory in the eastern Bosnia to the coal rich region of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, runs through Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs wanted the control of that 
important road. Finally, the Bosnian Serbs wanted to remove the possibility of any 
connection between the Muslims living in Yugoslavia's Sandzac region and the 
Muslims in Gorazde. Just like the Muslim-Croat side, the Bosnian Serbs also made 
their demands over Gorazde clear at the beginning of the peace process. 
Although both parties did not give up their demands over Gorazde, an 
agreement was reached at the Dayton Peace Talks. According to this agreement, 
Figure 1 
Municipalities of Bosnia –Herzegovina 
Gorazde would remain under the control of the Muslim-Croat side and would be 
open to Sarajevo with a wide corridor, which at its narrowest point was 8 km wide, 
on average 10-15 km wide, sometimes 30 km. wide. This meant that the Muslim-
Croat side would have a belt of territory wide enough to build the hydroelectric 
plants. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, would control Mrkonjic Grad, 
Sipovo, Ozren, Doboj, Modrico, Dervanta, (Bosanski) Brod, Samoc and Brcko. 
Visegrad, Srebrenica and Zepa would also remain Serb. 
Control of Srebrenica and Zepa deserves special emphasis at this critical 
division of territory, as the Muslim-Croat side had demanded the return of Sre-
brenica and Zepa, two Muslim strongholds which the Bosnian Serbs had captured 
in July and which still remained under Bosnian Serb control. For the Muslim-Croat 
side, these two cities were important as the symbols of the Serb slaughter of the 
Muslim civilians during the war. With the loss of these cities both at the battlefield 
and the negotiation table, they were now symbols of the price of the peace. 
As a result, the Muslim-Croat side's demand was fully satisfied by giving 
Gorazde to the Muslim-Croat Federation with a corridor to Sarajevo wide enough 
to build the hydroelectric plants. This solution can be identified as nonspecific 
compensation. In nonspecific compensation, one party completely gets what it 
wants, while the other party is compensated for its loss through some unrelated 
issue. The Muslim-Croat side got what it wanted; in return, the Bosnian Serb side 
was given Srebrenica and Zepa as compensation. 
Control of Eastern Slavonia 
In this problem, the negotiating parties were the Republic of Croatia and the 
rebel Croatian Serbs. The Republic of Croatia wanted to reintegrate Eastern Sla-
vonia into its legal order, as it was at that time under the de facto control of the 
rebel Croatian Serbs. 
The Republic of Croatia insisted on linking this problem to the peace process 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina for three important reasons. First of all, the Croats believed 
that if the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were lifted, 
there would not be any further negotiations on the reintegration of this area to the 
Republic of Croatia. The second reason was that there were 80,000 to 90,000 
displaced refugees who wanted to return to their homes in Eastern Slavonia. 
Finally, this had been the richest area of the Republic of Croatia both industrially 
and agriculturally, with many factories and crude oil deposits. 
The rebel Croatian Serbs did not want to give up the control of this region 
with the same underlying interest of possessing this oil rich area that had agri-
cultural and industrial potential. The Republic of Croatia showed its determination 
in reintegrating this area to the Republic by threatening to liberate the occupied 
areas by force, in case no solution was found in the peace process. 
Finally, on November 12, the Republic of Croatia and the rebel Croatian 
Serbs signed an agreement in Dayton concerning the problem of Eastern Slavonia. 
The parties agreed on a 12-month transitional period, which could be extended by 
another year upon the request of the signatories, under UN control, before Eastern 
Slavonia rejoined the Republic of Croatia. 
With this agreement, the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia would be 
facilitated. This agreement seems to satisfy the Croatian side while taking territory 
from the rebel Croatian Serbs. However, although there was no indication as to 
what the Serb side had received in exchange for its endorsement of the agreement, 
many diplomats in the Republic of Croatia said they expected that this agreement 
included a commitment to end sanctions against the FRY. In this case, the Republic 
of Croatia got what it wanted; in return, the Serbs received compensation in a 
totally unrelated field. Although the demand of the rebel Croatian Serbs was not 
met, in the sense that they lost Eastern Slavonia, another Serb demand, the lifting 
of sanctions against the FRY, was fulfilled. As a result, both the Republic of 
Croatia and the Serbs were satisfied, at least theoretically, through nonspecific 
compensation. 
Posavina Corridor and Brcko 
The Bosnian Serb demand of "compactness" of territory reflected itself also 
in the problem of the Posavina Corridor and the town of Brcko. Bosnian Serbs 
wanted to have Brcko, a town located at the northern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
for themselves and to widen the Posavina Corridor, which was next to that town. 
The corridor was already under Bosnian Serb control, but the Bosnian Serbs 
wanted a broader line to connect the eastern and western parts of the Serb entity 
The reason the Bosnian Serbs wanted to widen the corridor from its present 5 
km. to 18 km. was that they wanted a territorial link wide enough to allow their 
planes to fly from Serbia to Banja Luka, a Bosnian Serb-dominated town. Such a 
demand also obviously served to realize the compactness of Bosnian Serb territory. 
On the other hand, the Muslim-Croat side explicitly stated that they would not give 
up Brcko and they refused to widen the corridor. 
For the Muslim-Croat side the fundamental objective was simply the settle-
ment of this problem, because the functioning of the railway from Place to Tuzla 
would be disturbed as long as this corridor remained problematic. However, the 
Muslim-Croat side still did not deviate from rejecting the widening of the corridor 
more than about 5 km., which then was the actual distance between the Muslim-
Croat and Bosnian Serb armies. The Muslim-Croat side also had a concrete reason 
for refusing to compromise over the control of this corridor, as they hoped to cut 
through this strip of land to allow access to the Sava River on the Croatian border. 
Both parties were so reluctant to compromise on this problem that the Dayton 
Peace Talks almost failed. This issue remained unresolved at the Dayton Peace 
Talks. In the end, Brcko and the Posavina Corridor issues were left to international 
arbitration, which was to decide on the fate of the corridor no later than one year 
after the peace agreement came into force. In this way, this problem was prevented 
from endangering the whole peace agreement. 
Integrity of the State of Bosnia Herzegovina 
The Muslim-Croat side was in favor of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. They 
wanted a peace solution based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In contrast, the Bosnian Serbs were not in favour of an 
integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, as their ultimate goal was to establish a unitary state 
for all Serbs. 
The reason the Muslim-Croat side wanted an integral state was to prevent the 
partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once an independent Serb Republic was 
established as a consequence of such a partition, the Muslim-Croat side feared that 
this independent republic would unite with the FRY. In fact, the desire for the 
Bosnian Serbs to press for a union of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than a single 
state, and to insist on having the right to establish confederal links, confirmed the 
fears of the Muslim-Croat side in this regard. During the negotiations the parties 
gave different signals regarding their positions and priorities on the issue. For 
example, when the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY declared that a joint Bosnian Serb-
Yugoslav delegation would attend the peace talks, they stated that this would be a 
precursor of the confederal links between them. For the Muslim-Croat side, 
however, the most sensitive sub-issue was the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
They could tolerate a large degree of autonomy and special ties for the Serb entity 
with the FRY, but they would not accept the establishment of a Serb republic or a 
confederation between the FRY and the Serb entity. They wanted a unitary 
Bosnian republic. 
Two important accords that were decisive in the establishment of the state of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Geneva Accord and the New York Accord. The Geneva 
Accord deserves special emphasis, because the problem of integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was solved, to a great extent, with this accord. According to the 
Geneva Accord, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a single state within its present 
borders, but divided into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the Serb Republic. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina's international status as a single state 
within its present borders would be maintained, but 51% of its land would be 
controlled by the Federation, composed of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Croats, while 49% of its land would be controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. These two 
entities would also have the right to establish parallel special relations with the 
neighboring countries. 
The Geneva Accord had different implications for the Muslim-Croat side and 
the Bosnian Serbs. For the Muslim-Croat side, the integrity of the state was 
important, and with this accord the notion of a unitary state was preserved. Thus, 
the dream of Greater Serbia was juridically over. The Muslim-Croat side obviously 
made a concession by accepting the Serb entity, but for them, the division of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into two entities signified a division "within" the country, 
rather than a division "of the country. International recognition belonged to the 
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the two entities making up the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina were not internationally recognized according to the Geneva Accord. 
Since the Serb Republic was not independent, such a concession could be tolerated. 
A second concession the Muslim-Croat side had made was the recognition of 
the "special relationship" between the Bosnian Serbs and the FRY. The problem 
was that the extent of this "special relationship" was not specified. Later in the 
Dayton agreement it was stipulated that such a relationship should honor the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and any 
agreement on this should be approved by the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Furthermore, integration with other states was not permitted. 
For the Bosnian Serbs, the Geneva Accord was important as for the first time, 
the Serb Republic had been officially recognized. In addition, each entity was 
permitted to be self-governing under its own constitution. The Bosnian Serbs and 
the FRY perceived this to be a guarantee of independence for the Bosnian Serbs. 
The above account shows that the final settlement to the question of Bosnia-
Herzegovina's integrity can be classified as a distributive agreement. Both parties' 
initially declared positions were opposing. The Muslim-Croat side demanded an 
integral state while, on the other hand, the Bosnian Serbs anticipated an inde-
pendent state with special ties to the FRY. During the talks, the Muslim-Croat side 
made concessions by accepting the Serb entity. Similarly, Bosnian Serbs made 
concessions on the establishment of confederal links with the FRY. The 
distributive agreement was that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a single state within 
its present borders, but divided into two entities with no confederal link with the 
FRY. 
Political Authorities of the State 
The difference between the Muslim-Croat orientation towards an integral 
state and the Bosnian Serb orientation towards partition manifested itself in nego-
tiations over the political authorities of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
Muslim-Croat side wanted the creation of a strong central government, that is, the 
establishment of democratic institutions, such as an assembly, a presidency, and a 
constitutional court in which the Bosnian Serbs would not be able to block the 
decision-making processes {International Herald Tribune, 26 September 1995). 
The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, wanted to have institutions in which the 
Bosnian Serbs had equal rights in every issue with the Muslim-Croat side. 
The Muslim-Croat side was anxious that the Bosnian Serbs would prevent the 
functioning of the joint institutions of the republic, by blocking every process. 
Thus, they wanted to organize the institutions so that the Bosnian Serbs could not 
block normal life. If the joint institutions would not function, one day the Bosnian 
Serbs might claim that the idea of republic status did not work, and use this claim 
as a justification for secession from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Obvi-
ously, this would again mean the partition of the country. Therefore, the current 
interest of the Muslim-Croat side was to provide preconditions for the reintegration 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A legal precondition for this had already been set out by 
the Geneva Accord, and now the constitutional prerequisites and institutions that 
would enable the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be worked out. 
The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, wanted to have institutions in which 
they had equal rights with the Muslim-Croat side. The underlying interest was to 
prevent the political suppression of the Bosnian Serbs by the Muslim-Croat 
Federation, which was likely to happen in a parliament in which the Muslim-Croat 
side held the majority. A second underlying interest was to maintain the existence, 
as well as the equality of the Serb entity. 
In this context, the composition of the assembly and presidency and their 
decision-making procedures were important aspects of the problem. According to 
the New York accord, the future set-up would involve a parliament or a national 
assembly, a collective presidency and a constitutional court. The members of the 
parliament and presidency would be elected through free and democratic elections 
that would be held in both entities. Two-thirds of the members of the parliament or 
the national assembly would be elected from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(the Muslim-Croat side), and 1/3 from the Serb Republic (the Bosnian Serb side). 
In this parliament or assembly, the decisions on any issue would be taken by 
majority vote, but at least 1/3 of each entity should back up the decision and vote in 
favor. The presidency would have the same composition, of which 2/3 of its 
members would be from the Federation, and 1/3 from the Serb Republic. The 
decisions would also be taken by majority vote. However, if 1/3 of the total mem-
bers of the presidency disagreed with a decision and declared that that decision was 
destructive to a vital interest of the entity or entities, the decision would be referred 
back to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement did not change the essence of the New York 
Accord. It specified the numbers of the membership of the assembly and the 
presidency, but did not alter their decision-making procedures. Thus, the right to 
veto for each entity prevailed. The Muslim-Croat side found the Dayton Peace 
Agreement satisfactory as it had established institutions for a functioning state 
Thus, they had achieved the aim of having a strong central government in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs were also satisfied as they gained full equality 
and ensurance to handle their own affairs independently. In addition, they gained 
the right to veto, something that ensured the protection of the Serb people. 
This solution is best characterized as bridging. In bridging parties find a 
solution that fulfills everybody' underlying interests. In this issue, the Muslim-
Croat side's underlying interest, the establishment of the legal and constitutional 
preconditions that would prevent Serb secession, was realized by the establishment 
of functional central institutions of governance. The veto power satisfied the 
Bosnian Serbs's interest of preventing the political suppression of the Bosnian 
Serbs by the Muslim-Croat majority. 
Name of the State 
Since the beginning of the peace process, the Muslim-Croat side stated that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain a republic. The Muslim-Croat side wanted to 
have an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore preferred that the state would 
have a name such as "the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Their underlying 
interest was to keep the integrity of the state in order to prevent the secession of the 
Bosnian Serbs. 
The initial demand of Bosnian Serbs was for the division of the country. 
Therefore, even negotiations over the name of the state of Bosnia- Herzegovina 
was perceived as irrelevant. The Bosnian Serbs were against calling the state a 
"republic". Later the Bosnian Serbs agreed to call the state a "union," but this was a 
compromise for them. But, between "union" and "republic," they preferred to call it 
a "union" rather than a "republic," as a union implies the existence of independent 
entities that would be united by a looser kind of superstructure. Their 
core concern was the recognition of a Serb entity within the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, which would be a step toward the ultimate unification of the Serbs. 
Finally, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, established by the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, was called the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this issue, while 
one party's demands were fully satisfied, the other party did not get what it wanted. 
Therefore, this agreement can be classified as "cooptation," an extreme form of 
"distributive" outcome. 
Issue of Sarajevo 
The issue of Sarajevo was the third major issue on which the parties had 
divergent positions. The Muslim-Croat side wanted to have an undivided Sarajevo 
under its control, while the Bosnian Serbs wanted to control a part of Sarajevo. The 
Muslim-Croat side wanted Sarajevo to control vital communications and 
transportation sites. Second, they wanted a unified city, as a division of the city 
among hostile factions would create governance problems. However, the 
underlying interest of the Bosnian Serb side was quite different. The Bosnian Serb 
side was concerned about the future of the Serb minority living in Sarajevo. In 
addition, if they would control a part of Sarajevo, this would be a further indication 
of the legitimacy of their state within Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Sarajevo remained under the 
control of the Muslim-Croat Federation and would be undivided. In return, the 
Bosnian Serb side got some districts of Sarajevo and also Pale, the provisional 
capital city of the Bosnian Serbs. Although the Bosnian Serbs did not have the 
same underlying interest for the districts of Sarajevo and Pale, still they were 
important areas for the Bosnian Serbs, and they would compensate for the loss of 
Sarajevo to a certain extent. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs had received guarantees 
concerning the rights of the Serb minority living in Sarajevo. The solution provided 
by the Dayton Peace Agreement, therefore, can be formulated as nonspecific 
compensation and cost cutting. In non-specific compensation, one party gets what 
it wants and the other party is compensated in some unrelated issue. In this issue, 
the outcome completely satisfied the Muslim-Croat demand and compensated the 
loss of the Bosnian Serb side. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs had received 
guarantees concerning the rights of the Serb minority living in Sarajevo. This can 
be formulated as cost cutting because the safety concerns of the Bosnian Serbs, 
caused by the loss of the city, were reduced through these guarantees. 
Conclusion 
This paper has used Pruitt's (1977, 1986) framework to analyze a real-world 
negotiation process. The analysis in the previous section revealed that among the 
seven sub-issues and one main issue, the negotiated outcomes of three sub-issues 
and of the main issue were integrative. In two of these sub-issues (the control of 
Gorazde and the land link between Sarajevo and Gorazde, and the control of East-
ern Slavonia), non-specific compensation was used as the mechanism to reach 
integrative outcomes. In one sub-issue (the political authorities of the state), 
bridging was used. Finally, in one main issue (Sarajevo), cost cutting was used to 
reach integrative outcomes. Among the remaining four sub-issues, the negotiated 
outcome of the three sub-issues (the percentage of territory each party would get, 
the integrity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the issue of the name of the 
state) were distributive. Apart from that, one sub-issue (the Posavina Corridor and 
Brcko) was left to international arbitration. Table 2 summarizes our findings. 
 
Table 2 
Outcome results 
Issue Sub-Issue 
The Territorial Issue 1. The percentage of territory (distributive) 
2. The control of Gorazde (NSC) 
3. The control of Eastern Slavonia (NSC) 
4. The Posavina Corridor and Brcko (NA) 
The Constitutional Issue        1. The integrity of the state of Bosnia 
Herzegovina (distributive) 
2, The political authorities of the state 
(bridging) 
3. The name of the state (distributive) 
The Issue of Sarajevo (NSC and cost cutting) 
Note: NSC = Non specific compensation, NA = Not applicable 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the way that 
exchanges are made between and within the issues in the real world negotiations 
may be more complicated than what has been described in Pruitt and Rubin (1986). 
For example, in a single issue, more than one mechanism can be used 
simultaneously to find an agreement, e.g., in the issue of Sarajevo. In this case both 
nonspecific compensation and cost cutting were used to compensate the losses of 
Bosnian Serbs. 
Another conclusion is that in all kinds of mechanisms there is a division of 
resources. This takes place either by sharing a resource that is pronounced at the 
negotiation table, e.g., through distributive bargaining, or by complicated sharings, 
that is exhanges of issues that were not at the negotiation table in the first place and 
through exchanges of priorities, or compensated concessions. Each integrative 
formulation conveys a distributive aspect as well. For example, in nonspecific 
compensation, while one party gets what it wants, the other party is compensated. 
How much compensation the other party would get and the timing of it are matters 
of distribution. For example, in the issue of the control of Gorazde and the land 
corridor between Sarajevo and Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs were given Srebrenica 
and Zepa as compensation for the Muslim-Croat federation receiving a corridor to 
Sarajevo wide enough to build the hydroelectric plants. In this example, for 
instance if one party insists on getting the promised compensation in 6 months, and 
the other party insists on giving it in 12 months, this exchange may turn into a 
purely distributive bargaining. The same logic applies to cost cutting as well. In 
this form of agreement one party gets what it wants while the cost to the other party 
is reduced or eliminated. For example, in the issue of Sarajevo, the city as a whole 
remained under the control of the Muslim-Croat side, but the costs to the Bosnian 
Serbs were reduced by giving guarantees for the rights of the Serb minority living 
in Sarajevo. Again, a discussion of "the dimensions of the minority rights" to be 
extended, or the time framework in which these agreements are implemented may 
turn into a distributive process. Finally, in bridging, instead of fulfilling all interests, 
both parties' primary interests are met. In the issue of the political authorities of the 
state, for example, the primary interest of the Muslim-Croat side, the establishment 
of the legal and constitutional preconditions to pre-vent Serb secession was 
satisfied by the establishment of the institutions for the functioning of the state. The 
primary interest of the Bosnian Serbs in preventing their own political suppression 
was also satisfied through the veto power in the decision-making system. The result 
was a strong central government with a deci-sion-making system where the parties 
obtained veto power. Here as well, a dis-tributive potential is present, since the 
parties need to qualify what is "strong" central government or sufficient "veto" 
power. 
As mentioned previously, one body of literature on negotiation suggests that 
distributive behavior leads to distributive outcomes and vice versa. However, this 
study showed that integrative agreements can take place in what Ikle (1964) calls 
"redistribution" negotiations, where the status quo is challenged by one party and 
the other takes a defensive stand. In other words, mechanisms to reach integrative 
outcomes can be used even in negotiations where parties redistribute existing 
resources (in this case, the redistribution of former Yugoslavia). This finding sup-
ports the view that most negotiations consist of overlapping processes, and con-
tributes to the continuing discussion on the relative importance of competitive and 
cooperative processes in negotiation (Bartos, 1995; Hopmann, 1995; Dmckman, 
Martin, Nan, & Yagcioglu, 1998). 
Another conclusion is that in the specific case of the Dayton agreement the 
decision to talk reveals an interesting point about the role of the mediators. In this 
case, the US used pressure tactics both to bring the parties together and during the 
negotiations. The literature on third party intervention suggests that an agreement 
imposed by the mediator is unlikely to achieve stability in the long run (Mitchell & 
Banks, 1996). We claim that in diplomatic negotiations this may not be the case. 
While the long-term stability of the Dayton agreements necessarily remains open to 
question, a mediator strong enough to use pressure tactics to convince parties to 
talk and reach an agreement is also expected to be strong enough to create 
conditions for sustainable peace by helping them in getting integrated to the 
international community, by creating new interdependences and incentive systems 
to cooperate, etc. Similarly, a muscled mediator is often a guarantor of the post-
agreement implementation stage, and this creates another incentive to cooperate, 
especially for the weaker party. 
An important limitation of this methodology was the difficulty in learning the 
value each party attaches to a specific issue/sub-issue as well as the underlying 
interests of each party's position through documentary data. This had implications 
in the application of the "logrolling" category. Logrolling requires information 
about the parties' priorities. In diplomatic negotiations priorities are rarely made 
public. Therefore it was not possible to identify logrolling in this study. To over-
come this limitation, it might be useful to interview the negotiators who are in the 
best situation to know the interests underlying their positions. However, this is a 
very costly method of gathering information. Another way that would help to 
reveal the underlying interests is referring to the records of the negotiations and 
relevant documents of the agreement. This is also not possible for the time being as 
the Dayton Peace Agreement is a recent agreement and the documents are still 
classified. 
A second point that deserves emphasis is that this study analyzed the Dayton 
Peace Agreement at the issue and sub-issue level. It did not examine whether or 
how progress in one issue may have affected negotiations and outcomes in the rest 
of the issues. For example, it did not examine whether the parties perceived any 
trade offs between the territorial and constitutional issues, but instead analyzed 
each sub-issue of the territorial and constitutional issue in itself. In addition, 
although the analysis showed that the negotiated outcomes of individual issues 
were integrative outcomes that theoretically increased mutual benefits, our 
approach did not enable us to measure the magnitude of this increase. 
In conclusion, we provided in this article an application of integrative cate-
gories to an international negotiation. This allowed us to give a fine-grained picture 
of the use of different mechanisms in a non-laboratory setting. Future research 
should look further into how different agreement mechanisms interact with each 
other across the issues. Multiple case studies of international agreements are 
needed to evaluate whether our findings can be generalized. 
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